Abstract. We develop a methodology for optimal design of financial instruments aimed to hedge some forms of risk that is not traded on financial markets. The idea is to minimize the risk of the issuer under the constraint imposed by a buyer who enters the transaction if and only if her risk level remains below a given threshold. Both agents have also the opportunity to invest all their residual wealth on financial markets, but with different access to financial investments. The problem is reduced to a unique inf-convolution problem involving a transformation of the initial risk measures.
Introduction
The past decade has seen the emergence of a range of financial instruments depending on risks traditionally considered to be within the remit of the insurance sector. Examples are weather and catastrophe claims, contingent on the occurrence of certain weather or catastrophic events. The development of instruments at the interface of insurance and finance raises new questions, not only about their classification but also about their design, pricing and management. The pricing issue is particularly intriguing as it questions the very logic of such contracts. Indeed, standard principles for derivatives pricing based on replication do not apply any more because of the special nature of the underlying risk. On the other hand, the question of the product design, unusual in finance, is raised since the logic behind these products is closer to that of an insurance policy. The present paper undertakes the study of these problems in a framework where economic agents may take positions on two types of risk: a purely financial risk (or market risk) and a (non-financial) non-tradable risk. The optimal structure of a contract depending on the non-tradable risk and its price are determined. Several authors, notably El Karoui and Rouge (2000), Becherer (2001) , Davis (2001) and Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2004) , have been interested in these new products. As is usual in finance, they focus on the pricing rule of the contracts. Our analysis of insurance-type derivatives is broader, addressing also their impact on "classical" investments and their optimal design. We assume that the two parties to the contract, the buyer and the seller, may invest on the financial market, possibly with different access to assets. They are assumed to optimize their investment strategies simultaneously with the characterization of the non-tradable structure. Since this structure represents a new diversification instrument for any investor, optimal wealth allocation becomes more complex and the question of efficient quantitative risk assessment becomes crucial. The framework of this study will be that of recent works by Artzner et al. (1999) , Schied (2002a, 2002b) and others, who propose axiomatic approaches to the construction of convex risk measures. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents some results in an exponential utility framework, where both agents have access to a financial market to reduce their risk. Section 3 presents a more general framework involving convex risk measures and their inf-convolution. In Section 4, we study the impact of both the financial market and the non-tradable risk on risk measures and give a characterization of the optimal structure, explicitly for a particular family of risk measures and as a necessary and sufficient condition in the general framework. Two examples are given in Section 5, about the hedging issue and the optimality in the inf-convolution problem. Finally, in the last section, we present some concluding remarks.
2 The exponential utility framework 2.1 A simplified approach: the "toy model"
Framework
Two economic agents, henceforth called A and B, are operating in an uncertain universe modeled by a probability space (Ω, , P). At a fixed future date T , agent A is exposed to a non-tradable risk for an amount X. In order to reduce her exposure, A wants to issue a financial product F and sell it to agent B against a forward price π at time T . We assume that X and F belong to X , the linear space of bounded functions including constant functions. Both agents are supposed to be risk-averse. We assume that they are working with the same kind of choice criterion, an increasing exponential utility function U (x) = −γ exp − 1 γ x , x ∈ R, with risk tolerance coefficients γ A and γ B respectively. Agent A's objective is to choose the optimal structure (F, π) so as to maximize the expected utility of her final wealth, i.e. seeking:
Her constraint is that agent B should have an interest to enter into this transaction. At least, the F -structure should not worsen agent B's expected utility. Agent B compares two expected utility levels, the first one corresponding to the case where she simply invests her initial wealth in a bank account and the second one to the situation where she enters the F -transaction. Thus, agent A is working under the constraint:
where x is the non-risky (forward) wealth of agent B before the F -transaction. With the exponential utility functions, the problem to solve is:
Given the convexity of the program, the constraint is bounded at the optimum and the optimal pricing rule π * (F ) of the financial product F is entirely determined by the buyer as π * (F ) = −γ B ln E P exp − 1 γ B F −e γ B (F ) .
She determines the minimal pricing rule, ensuring the existence of the transaction. The price π * (F ) corresponds to the maximal amount agent B is ready to pay to enter the F -transaction and bear the associated risk. In other words, π * (F ) corresponds to the certainty equivalent of F for the utility function of agent B, or to the indifference pricing rule at which Agent B is indifferent, from her utility point of view, between doing the F -transaction and not doing it. Remark: i) Exponential utility functions are widely used in the finance literature. Convenient properties of exponential utility functions are the absence of constraint on the sign of the future considered cash flows and their relationship with change in probability measures.
ii) The notion of indifference price has been widely studied in the literature, especially when replicating a terminal cash flow using a utility criterion (see for instance, Hodges and Neuberger (1989) or El Karoui and Rouge (2000)).
iii) The framework we consider is rather standard in insurance policy design (see for instance Raviv (1979) ).
Optimal structure
In the present simple framework, henceforth referred to as the "toy model", the optimal structure is given by the so-called Borch's Theorem, presented below. In a quite general utility framework, Borch (1962) obtained optimal exchange of risk, leading in many cases to familiar linear quota-sharing of total pooled losses.
Proposition 2.1 (Borch) The optimal structure of the Program (1) is given as a proportion of the initial exposure X, depending only on the risk tolerance coefficients of both agents:
Proof:
The convex constrained Program (1) may be solved by introducing a Lagrangian multiplier λ > 0. The function to be minimized is then
For any scenario ω, the convex function g
is minimum at the point g * satisfying the first order condition exp −
where c (λ) is given by Equation (2) for
Formulation in terms of certainty equivalent
Looking at the previous results, the convex entropic functional (this name will be justified later):
plays an important role, especially in characterizing the pricing rule of the structure. It corresponds to the opposite of the certainty equivalent of Ψ.
One of its key properties is the translation invariance as
Using this functional, the Program (1) may be rewritten as
Using the translation invariance property, we find directly the optimal pricing rule as π * (F ) = −e γ B (F ). Moreover, it is now possible to solve the program without introducing a Lagrangian multiplier since
Given the optimal structure F * previously obtained in Proposition 2.1, the value functional of this program, E AB (X), may also be expressed in terms of e γ and the equality below can be easily obtained:
It is simply the opposite of the certainty equivalent of X considering a representative agent with an exponential utility function and a risk tolerance coefficient equal to γ C . Remark: i) The parameter γ C is simply the sum of the risk tolerance coefficients γ A and γ B . This means that the representative agent has a risk tolerance equal to the sum of the risk tolerance of both agents. This justifies using the term risk tolerance instead of risk aversion.
ii) The introduction of the functional e γ enables us to characterize and interpret very easily the value function of the considered program. A direct approach using Subsection 2.1.2 does not lead to such a straightforward result.
Investment and diversification in a financial market
In order to reduce their risk exposure, both agents may also invest in a financial market. The market plays a hedging role for the agents. Note that we use the generic terminology "financial markets" but it may cover a more general investment framework, including, for instance, purchase of insurance. The introduction of a financial market leads to a much more complicated problem even if results will turn out to remain very simple and surprisingly robust.
Hedging portfolios and investment strategies
In this paper we do not really need to specify the characteristics of the financial investments. We simply consider a set V T of bounded terminal gains ξ T , at time T , resulting from self-financing investment strategies with a null initial value. More precisely, the net potential gain is defined as the spread between the terminal wealth resulting from the adopted strategy and the capitalized initial wealth. The key point is that all agents in the market agree on the initial value of these strategies, in other words, the initial market value of any of these strategies is null. In particular, a possible admissible strategy is associated with a derivative contract with bounded terminal payoff Φ only if its forward market price at time T , q m (Φ), is a transaction price for all agents in the market. Then, Φ − q m (Φ) is the bounded terminal gain at time T and is an element of V T . A typical example of admissible terminal gains ξ T is then the terminal wealth associated with transactions based on options. Generally, and especially when adopting a dynamic point of view, it is natural to consider terminal gains associated with dynamic investment strategies. A detailed framework will be introduced, when needed in Section 5. Moreover, in order to have coherent transaction prices, we assume that the market is arbitrage-free. In our framework, it can be expressed by the following condition:
Considering the traded financial assets, with a terminal payoff Φ, such a condition is written as q m (Φ) = E Q (Φ). The probability measure Q may be viewed as a static version of the classical V T -martingale measures in a dynamic framework, even if it is not a "standard" equivalent martingale measure but an equivalent submartingale measure in the sense that all hedged positions are positive on average.
Financial properties of V T and hedging strategies of both agents
The set V T , previously defined, has to satisfy some properties to be coherent with certain investment principles. The first principle, being the "minimal assumption", is the consistency with the diversification principle. In other words, any convex combination of admissible gains should also be an admissible gain. Hence, the set V T is always taken as a convex set. Some additional requirements may be introduced. In particular, if agents are not sensitive to the size of the transactions, V T is assumed to be a cone. Such an assumption is relevant for liquid markets where it is possible to make a given order in any quantity. Finally, if agents are not sensitive to the direction of the transactions (buy/sell), V T is a sub-vector space. This assumption is consistent with the most liquid part of the market.
Even if there exists a unique large underlying financial market, both agents may not have the same access to it. Indeed, both agents may be of very different natures a priori. The set of hedging products to which they have access may be different, due to differences in goals and regulatory constraint between e.g. insurance companies, reinsurance companies, banks, private investors... The set of admissible strategies for Agent A (resp. Agent B) is characterized by the associated terminal gains and is denoted by V
T ). The minimal assumption is that both V is then associated with investment strategies. In the rest of the paper, however, we will not distinguish and refer to both types of strategies as hedging strategies.
Optimization problem

Optimization program
The impact of the financial market concerns above all agent B. Indeed, since she initially invests on financial markets, the F -transaction will be of interest to her only if it can increase her expected utility level, taking into account her optimal financial investments. The investor has now a threshold on her hedging strategies. The issuer may also invest optimally on the financial market. Therefore, her problem is simply to maximize the expected utility of her global terminal wealth. In other words, the optimization program is
or equivalently, using the convex entropic functional e γ previously defined by Equation (4)
Assumption: In the following, we assume that
Such a condition guarantees that, for any Ψ ∈ X , inf ξi∈V
e γi (Ψ − ξ i ) is finite, for both i = A, B. Indeed, the functional e γ is decreasing and Ψ is bounded by − Ψ ∞ and Ψ ∞ , where Ψ ∞ = inf{c > 0 , P(|Ψ| > c) = 0}. Therefore, using the cash translation invariance property, we obtain
Taking the infimum leads to the result.
Optimal pricing rule
The optimal pricing rule is obtained, as previously, by binding the constraint imposed by the buyer at the optimum and using the cash translation invariance property of the functional e γ π * (F ) = inf
The previous comment ensures that the optimal price is finite for any F in X . The optimal pricing rule corresponds to an indifference price since it makes the investor, agent B, indifferent between doing or not doing the F -transaction. The formulation is less direct than that of the "toy model" (Equation (2)) as it involves optimal investments on financial markets. Note also that, as previously, the exponential utility makes the initial wealth x irrelevant for the pricing rule.
Relationship with the "toy model"
Using the optimal pricing rule and the translation invariance property of the functional e γ , the optimization Program (10) may be rewritten as
This optimization Program looks very similar to the previous optimization problem (7), referred to as "toy model", when no hedging strategy is available. The only difference comes from the accrued complexity e γ A (X − F ) and e γ B (F ) with inf ξ A ∈V
. A first natural choice to solve this problem is therefore to study the functional Ψ −→ inf ξ∈V T e γ (Ψ − ξ). This method is not so easy and not so efficient as the one we choose to present here... But it was our first approach! The nature of the modified functional Ψ −→ inf ξ∈V T e γ (Ψ − ξ) will be studied in details in the next sections, in reference to the pricing via utility maximization in incomplete markets. The following Proposition and its proof present some additional simplifications that can be made:
The value functional of the Program (12), E m AB (X), is equal to the value functional of inf
The Program (12) is a succession of three minimizations:
Hence, choosing the order of minimization, we obtain
Using a translation of ξ B and letting F F − ξ B ∈ X enables us to rewrite it as
This new Program is closely related to the "toy model". The intermediate optimization program
corresponds indeed to the toy model (Equation (7)) with the initial risk exposure X − ξ A − ξ B instead of X and the structure F to be determined. Hence, using the previous result on the value functional of the toy model problem (see Equation (8)
. Hence, as a consequence of Equation (14), the value functional of the optimization Program (12) is also given by
Optimal structure
Considering the right order of minimization, as presented in Proposition 2.2, is crucial since it reduces considerably the difficulties of solving. However, in order to solve completely the intermediate optimization problems, we have to use the reverse approach, starting from the global hedging problem and then deriving the optimal structure and the individual hedging problems. More precisely, the first problem to be solved is the "global hedging problem", which is more or less classical:
T . Its originality comes from the relative complexity of the set of admissible financial strategies we consider. To characterize the optimal structure, we first suppose that the Program (P AB ) has an optimal solution ξ * ∈ V (A)
T , in other words that there exists a decomposition (not necessarily unique) of ξ
is an optimal structure. It characterizes a Pareto-optimal exchange of risk. Moreover, i) η * B is an optimal investment portfolio for Agent B;
A is an optimal hedging portfolio of (X − F * ) for Agent A;
We give here a detailed proof of this result which will be used later in Theorem 4.2 in a more general context. Proof: To prove this theorem, we proceed in several steps:
Step 1:
given Proposition 2.2. Using the "toy model" optimality result (Proposition 2.1), we obtain directly an expression for the optimal "structure" F * as:
Step 2: Rewriting in the reverse order the arguments used in the proof of Proposition 2.2, we naturally set F * = F * +η * B . We then want to prove that η * B is an optimal investment for agent B.
For the sake of simplicity in our notation, we consider
Given the optimality of ξ
Then η * B is optimal for the problem
. The optimality of η * A can be proved using the same arguments.
Step 3: Pareto optimality Assume that a structure F * A improves the situation of agent A:
. Consequently, if agent A improves her situation, agent B worsens hers, and vice versa. This is exactly the definition of Pareto-optimality. Question of uniqueness: (1) Assume that ξ * has two distinct decompositions, ξ
T , then it admits an infinity of decompositions, since any convex combination of these decompositions is also an admissible decomposition due to the convexity of both sets V T . Hence there exists an infinity of optimal structures:
Assume that both V are cones. We write ξ * as ξ
There is no influence of the common financial market through κ AB . 
and it is then possible to generate an infinity of optimal structures by simply adding elements of V
Note finally that even if there is an infinity of optimal structures, the terminal wealth of agent B is uniquely determined for any optimal solution ξ * of the global hedging problem and equal to
The previous Theorem has two corollaries, corresponding to two particular situations:
and there is an optimal solution of the Program (P AB ). Then,
is an optimal structure.
* is an optimal decomposition, where
are elements of V T since V T is a convex set and 0 ∈ V T . When both agents have the same access to the financial market, the underlying logic of the transaction is non-speculative as the issuer has an interest to sell a structure if and only if she is initially exposed (or, more precisely, if her initial exposure differs from that of the buyer). The underlying logic is that of insurance and hedging. This Corollary gives an extension of the classical Borch's Theorem to the situation where an investment alternative is available for the agents. T . If Agent A is not initially exposed (X ≡ 0), there is still a transaction if both agents have different access to the financial market.
When both agents do not have the same access to the financial market, a transaction may still take place if the issuer is not initially exposed. This may be an opportunity for either agent to buy some derivative products in the other agent's market to which she may not have direct access. The underlying logic may be in this sense no longer non-speculative. Both agents can exchange some financial portfolios (of their own market) in a way proportional to their relative risk tolerance. Their own financial market portfolio plays the same role as a non-tradable asset for the other agent. The question of optimal hedging portfolios will be tackled naturally in the more general framework of convex risk measures where arguments are identical. As a consequence, we leave it to Subsection 5.1. The obtained results depend neither on the modeling of the financial investment gain processes nor on the distribution of the non-financial risk. In this sense, they are extremely robust. They do however seem to be highly dependent on the entropic choice criterion. Therefore, a natural question is how these results extend to other risk criteria. This is the topic of the following sections.
Risk measures: basic properties and new developments
As noticed in the previous section, the right framework to work with is that of the functional e γ . This enables us to define an entropic risk measure with certain key properties like convexity, monotonicity and cash translation invariance. In the rest of the paper, we will work on the possible extensions of these results to a more general framework of risk measures holding these properties. We will obtain an extraordinary robustness of the results in the exponential utility framework. In this section, we define and present the general framework we adopt in the next sections. First, we introduce a general class of risk measures introduced by Föllmer and Schied (2002a) and (2002b) to measure the risk of both agent's exposure. Then, we generate new risk measures as solution of an inf-convolution problem and finally derive the main results which enable us to re-formulate in Section 4 the optimal structure problem into a very simple convex problem.
Convex risk measures
Definition and properties
We first recall the definition and some key properties of the convex risk measures introduced by Föllmer and Schied (2002a) and (2002b). As before, X denotes a linear space of bounded functions including constant functions.
is a convex risk measure if, for any X and Y in X , it satisfies the following properties:
Intuitively, ρ (Ψ) may be interpreted as the amount the agent has to hold to completely cancel the risk associated with her risky position Ψ ρ (Ψ + ρ (Ψ)) = 0.
The axiomatic approach to risk measures has been first introduced by Artzner et al. (1999) . They consider coherent risk measures, satisfying the previous three properties of convexity, monotonicity and translation invariance, together with an positive homogeneity property: ∀Ψ ∈ X , ∀λ ≥ 0, ν
Remark: A risk measure ρ satisfying the three axioms a), b) and c) in Definition 3.1 is finite for any Ψ ∈ X as soon as ρ (0) is finite. Indeed, any element of X is a bounded random variable. So, for any Ψ ∈ X there exist two real numbers m and M such that m ≤ Ψ ≤ M . Hence, using the monotonicity property of ρ, we have ∀Ψ ∈ X ρ (Ψ) = sup
By duality between M 1,f and X ,
Moreover, the supremum is attained in M 1,f and ∀Ψ ∈ X ρ (Ψ) = max
This last result is important as it ensures the existence of an "optimal" additive measure.
In the following, we are especially interested in risk measures related to probability measures. We make the assumption of continuity from above in the sense that:
which is equivalent to lower semicontinuity with respect to bounded pointwise convergence (Lemma 4. 16, Föllmer and Schied (2002b) ). This assumption implies that the dual formulation of risk measure (Equation (16)) is satisfied for Q ∈ M 1 , where M 1 is the set of all probability measures on the considered space. In this case, Equation (17) concerning the penalty function still holds if we replace M 1,f by M 1 . When working with M 1 , the supremum is attained under some conditions presented in Theorem 4.22 of Föllmer and Schied (2002b) . In the present paper, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, we use the notation Q when dealing with additive measures and Q when dealing with probability measures.
Example 3.4 The dual formulation of the functional e γ justifies the name of entropic risk measure since
where h (Q/P) is the relative entropy of Q with respect to the prior probability P, defined by h (Q/P) = E P dQ dP ln dQ dP if Q P and + ∞ otherwise.
Risk measure generated by a convex set
Acceptance set and generation of convex risk measures From the definition of the convex risk measure ρ and the duality relationship with the penalty function, it is natural to define the acceptance set A ρ related to ρ as the set of all acceptable positions carrying no positive risk:
It has the following properties: (i) A ρ is a non-empty convex set and inf {m ∈ R; m ∈ A ρ } > −∞, (ii) For any X ∈ A ρ and any Y ∈ X , Y ≥ X ⇒ Y ∈ A ρ , (iii) A ρ has a closure property in the sense that for any X ∈ A ρ and any Y ∈ X ,
As a direct consequence of Equation (15), the risk measure ρ and the penalty function α may be expressed in terms of A ρ as
and
It is possible to consider the relationship (21) between ρ and A ρ as a definition of the risk measure ρ and then, to extend it to general convex set in order to generate particular convex risk measures.
Definition 3.5 Given a non-empty convex subset of X , H, we define ν H (Ψ) = inf {m ∈ R; such that ∃ξ ∈ H, m + Ψ ≥ ξ} .
If ν H (0) > −∞, ν H is a convex risk measure and the related acceptance set is defined by
The associated penalty function l H is given by
When H is a cone, the penalty function associated with ν H is the indicator function of the cone
in the sense of the convex analysis (see Rockafellar (1970) ):
The risk measure ν H is then coherent and its dual formulation is simply given by
Interpretation in terms of buyer's price The risk measure generated by H can be given another interpretation. Considering any ξ ∈ H as a hedging strategy, ν H (Ψ) corresponds indeed to the opposite of the buyer's price of Ψ. The buyer of Ψ is satisfied by a strategy (x, ξ) such that Ψ ≥ x + ξ. For a given ξ, the buyer always considers the worst case, corresponding to the maximal amount x such that Ψ ≥ x + ξ:
Consequently, the arg sup is the maximal price the buyer is willing to pay for Ψ and may be seen as the equivalent for the buyer of the super-replicating price for the seller. Given that ν H is defined by ν H (Ψ) = inf {m ∈ R, ∃ξ ∈ H, Ψ + m ≥ ξ}, we finally obtain that the risk measure of Ψ is the opposite of the "super buyer's price" of Ψ:
In a very general framework of a convex risk measure ρ, p (Ψ) −ρ (Ψ) may also be interpreted as a price. It corresponds indeed to the (capitalized) "indifference" buyer's price which leaves the agent indifferent between buying Ψ for a price p and doing nothing since
Inf-convolution of risk measures
Main results
Föllmer and Schied proved that the supremum of a sequence of convex risk measures is also a convex risk measure (Proposition 4.15 in Föllmer and Schied (2002b)).
The Theorem below gives another stability property of convex risk measures and their penalty functions. The notations we use are those of Rockafellar (1970) .
Theorem 3.6 Let ρ 1 and ρ 2 be two convex risk measures with penalty functions α 1 and α 2 respectively. Let ρ 1,2 be the inf-convolution of ρ 1 and ρ 2 defined as
and assume that ρ 1,2 (0) > −∞. Then ρ 1,2 is a convex risk measure, which is finite for all Ψ ∈ X . Moreover, if ρ 1 is continuous from below, then ρ 1,2 is also continuous from below. The associated penalty function is given by
The related acceptance set A ρ1,2 is the "pseudo-closure" of A ρ1 + A ρ2 (in the sense of Föllmer and Schied (2002b) Proposition 4.5)
Note that the convex risk measure ρ 1,2 may also be defined as the value functional of the program
An immediate consequence is: Corollary 3.7 Let H be a convex subset of X , and let ρ be a convex risk measure with penalty function α such that inf {ρ (−H) , H ∈ H} > −∞. Then the inf-convolution of ρ and ν H ,
is a convex risk measure with penalty function
and + ∞ otherwise.
Proof:
We need only to prove the equality ρ
The reverse inequality is immediate as H ⊂ A H . Proof of Theorem 3.6: i) The monotonicity and translation invariance properties of ρ 1,2 are immediate.
ii) The convexity simply comes from the fact that, for any Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 , H 1 and H 2 in X and any λ ∈ [0, 1], the following inequalities hold as ρ 1 and ρ 2 are convex risk measures:
By adding the inequalities and taking the infimum over H 1 and H 2 on the left-hand side and in H 1 on the right-hand side, we obtain:
Taking then the infimum over H 2 on the right-hand side yields the convexity inequality for ρ 1,2 .
iii) The continuity from below is directly obtained upon considering an increasing sequence of (Ψ n ) ∈ X converging to Ψ. Using the monotonicity property, we have
iv) The assumption ρ 1,2 (0) > −∞ guarantees that ρ 1,2 (Ψ) is finite for any Ψ ∈ X , as previously mentioned. v) Using Equation (17) , the associated penalty function of any Q∈M 1,f is given by
Letting Ψ Ψ − H ∈ X , and recalling that X is the set of all bounded random variables, we obtain
using Equation (22) . vi) As a consequence of Equation (22), the acceptance set of the new risk measure ρ 1,2 is given by
However, we also know that
More precisely, let us consider two sequences (Ψ 
We are now interested in the relationships between both sets A ρ1 + A ρ2 and A ρ12 . Both are convex sets. However, A ρ1 + A ρ2 does not necessarily satisfy the closure property (20).
Dilatation of convex risk measures and semi-group properties
In this subsection, we present an example of risk measure transformation which is stable by inf-convolution and satisfies a dilatation property with respect to the size of the position.
Definition 3.8 Let ρ be a convex risk measure with penalty function α and γ > 0 a real parameter called the risk tolerance coefficient. The dilated risk measure ρ γ , associated with ρ and γ, is defined by
The associated penalty function is ∀Q∈M 1,f α ργ (Q) = γα (Q).
Note that the entropic functional e γ is the dilated risk measure associated with the convex risk measure e 1 . In this entropic case, this dilatation property has been referred to as volume scaling by Becherer (2003) . Moreover, as noticed when studying the "toy model", the inf-convolution of two entropic risk measures is again an entropic risk measure. The risk tolerance coefficient of the latter is simply the sum of the two risk tolerance coefficients (see Equation (8)). In other words, a stability property holds for entropic risk measures for any (γ, γ ), strictly positive: e γ e γ = e γ+γ . Such a property still holds for general dilated risk measures:
Theorem 3.9 Let (ρ γ , γ > 0) be the family of ρ-dilated risk measures. Then, the following properties hold:
X is an optimal structure for the minimization program:
iii) Let ρ and ρ be two convex risk measures. Then, for any γ > 0, ρ γ ρ γ = (ρ ρ ) γ .
Proof:
Both i) and iii) are immediate consequences of the definition and the characterization of dilated risk measures. ii) Let us search for the optimal structure in the family {αX; α ∈ R}. Then,
A natural candidate is then obtained for iii) Moreover, ρ 0 lim γ→0 ρ γ is simply the "super-pricing rule" of −Ψ:
Proof: i) comes immediately from the definition and characterization of both coherent risk measures and dilated risk measures. ii) Let us first observe that ρ γ is a decreasing function of γ. This monotonicity property comes from the dual representation of convex risk measures together with the expression of the penalty function of dilated risk measure. The risk measure corresponding to an infinite risk tolerance, ρ ∞ lim γ→∞ ↓ ρ γ , is a coherent risk measure since:
Moreover, since
iii) By monotonicity, denoting by Q α = {Q ∈ M 1,f ;α (Q) < ∞}, we obtain:
Optimal design problem
This Section is dedicated to our initial problem of characterizing the optimal issue written on the non-tradable risk in the general framework presented above.
Framework
In this section, we come back to our initial problem of optimal transaction between agent A and agent B described in Subsection 2.1.1: At a fixed future date T , agent A is exposed towards a non-tradable risk for an amount X. To reduce her exposure, she wants to issue a financial product F and sell it to agent B for a forward price at time T denoted by π. Both agents now assess the risk associated with their respective positions by a convex risk measure, denoted by ρ A and ρ B (with penalty functions α A and α B , respectively). As previously described (Subsection 2.2), both agents may reduce their risk by also investing in the financial market, choosing optimally their financial investments via, in general, two convex sets V T .
1. The opportunity to invest optimally in a financial market reduces the risk of both agents. To assess their respective risk exposure, they now refer to a market modified risk measure defined by
We also make the standard assumption ρ 
Given Corollary 3.7, we introduce the risk measures generated by both convex sets V 2. Consequently, the optimization program related to the F -transaction is simply
As previously, using the cash translation invariance property and binding the constraint at the optimum, the pricing rule of the F -structure is fully determined by the buyer as
It corresponds to an "indifference" pricing rule from the point of view of agent B's market modified risk measure.
3. Using again the cash translation invariance property, the optimization program reduces to
We are almost in the framework of Theorem 3.6, apart from the constant ρ m B (0). Noticing that the value functional obtained in this case should be translated by the constant −ρ m B (0) in order to obtain the value function of the previous program, we consider the reduced program
The value functional R m AB of this program, resulting from the inf-convolution of four different risk measures, may be interpreted as the residual risk measure after all transactions. 
. Note that the financial market plays exactly the same role as an intermediate agent imposing some constraint on the considered agent. As a consequence, we end up with four different risk measures, two for each agent.
Dilated risk measures and Borch's Theorem
Our problem is to construct optimal structures. We have already solved it completely in the entropic framework (assuming the solution of the hedging problem). In that case, the existence of a solution is ensured. In the general case, it may be more of a problem. However, in the particular case when both agents have the same type of risk measure, with possibly different risk tolerances, everything becomes very simple as we will see in the following. Thus, we consider the situation where both agents have dilated initial risk measures, ρ A and ρ B . In this sense, we may say that the framework is symmetric for both agents. The residual risk measure R m AB (X) may be simplified using the commutativity property of the inf-convolution and the semi-group property of dilated risk measures:
where ρ C is the dilated risk measure associated with the risk tolerance coefficient
We present two results depending on the access both agents have to the financial markets. The proofs will be presented in the next section, when some general results on optimality in inf-convolution problems are derived.
Borch's Theorem
Let us first assume that both agents have the same access to the financial market via a cone H. Given the fact that the risk measure generated by H is coherent and thus invariant by dilatation, the market modified risk measures of both agents are dilated from ρ ν
. Using Theorem 3.9, we find again the so-called Borch's theorem: Proposition 4.1 If both agents have dilated risk measures and have the same access to the financial market via a cone, then an optimal structure, solution of the minimization Program (26) is given by:
Different access to hedging strategies
In a more general framework, when both agents have different access to the financial market, we may use the same arguments as in the entropic framework, after some transformation. By Equation (27) , R m AB (X) = ρ C ν A ν B (X), and using the properties of the inf-convolution,
Then, R m AB (X) is very similar to the residual risk measure in the entropic framework, E m AB (X), given as the value functional of the Program (P AB ). As a consequence, the following result is very similar to Theorem 2.3. The proof, consisting of three main steps, has been detailed in Subsection 2.1.2. It does not use the explicit formulation of the entropic risk measure and can be directly extended to the general framework. T . Then
is an optimal structure. Moreover, i) η * B is an optimal investment portfolio for Agent B;
Standard diversification will also occur in exchange economies as soon as agents have proportional penalty functions. This extends the results obtained in the entropic framework of Section 2. The regulator has to impose very different rules on agents as to generate risk measures with non-proportional penalty functions if she wants to increase the diversification in the market. In other words, diversification occurs when agents are very different. Such a result supports, for instance, the intervention of reinsurance companies on financial markets in order to increase diversification.
Characterization of the optimal structure in the general framework
We now consider the general framework where the problem is to find a structure F * optimizing the Program Note that everything relies upon the existence of an optimal additive measure Q X AB for R m AB (X). As mentioned in Subsection 3.1.1, the existence of such an additive measure is guaranteed as soon as the penalty function is defined by (22) . When working with probability measures M 1 , the supremum ρ (Ψ) = sup Q∈M1 {E Q (−Ψ) − α (Q)} is attained under some topological conditions obtained by Föllmer and Schied (2002b) (Theorem 4.22 ) . It may be worth noticing however that if one of the risk measures involved in the inf-convolution is continuous from below, then the optimal additive measure of the inf-convolution is in fact σ-additive.
Proof:
In the proof, we denote by Ψ c , the centered random variable Ψ with respect to the given additive measure Q
In particular, all inequalities are equalities and
It follows that F * is optimal for the inf-convolution problem, or equivalently for the program on the righthand side of this equality, if and only if F * is optimal for the two problems sup 
ii) When ρ is the entropic risk measure with the penalty function γh (Q/P), an optimal hedge Ψ * satisfies the three properties obtained above. More precisely: Ψ * ∈ H, E Q * (Ψ * ) = 0 and γh (Q * /P) = −e γ (X c − Ψ * ).
Equivalently,
. Necessarily, an optimal probability measure is equivalent to P and has a finite relative entropy with respect to P. We will come back to this particular question in Subsection 5.2. We will then prove that under some additional assumption, this condition is also sufficient for optimality.
Optimality in the inf-convolution problem: some examples
We now study the hedging problem through its related inf-convolution problem. We consider first a general framework of convex risk measure and then come back to the hedging problem in the entropic framework. This question has been widely studied in the literature under the name of "hedging in incomplete markets and pricing via utility maximization" in some particular frameworks. Most of the studies have considered exponential utility functions. Among the numerous papers, we may quote the papers by 
Some existence results for the hedging problem
We are interested here in solving the following inf-convolution problem (P):
where V T is a convex set of bounded variables and ρ is a convex risk measure, continuous from below. Preliminary results The existence of a solution to this problem is closely related to the following properties of the functional ρ:
We assume that for any elements (X, Y ) ∈ X 2 such that for X = Y P a.s. ρ (X) = ρ (Y ). Then the properties given by Equation (28) are also true when considering almost surely convergence. Moreover, a key argument in the proof of the existence of a solution relies upon the following version of the Komlos Theorem (Komlos (1967)):
Then there exists a subsequence (φ n ) of (φ n ) and a function φ * ∈ L 1 (P) such that for every further subsequence (φ n ) of (φ n ),
We are able to present the following theorem on existence:
is attained for a random variable ξ * in L ∞ (P), belonging to the closure of V T with respect to the a.s. convergence.
convex and bounded in L ∞ (P), the infimum of the hedging program ρ m (X) inf
is attained for ξ T . Proof: Note first that the proof of this theorem relies on arguments similar to those used by Kabanov and Stricker (2002) . i) Let (ξ n ∈ V T ) be a minimizing sequence for the hedging program ρ m (X) inf ξ∈V T ρ (X − ξ) such that ρ (X − ξ n ) tends to ρ m (X). Given the assumption that (ξ n ) is a L ∞ -bounded sequence, we can apply Theorem 5.1. Therefore, there exists a subsequence (ξ j k ∈ V T ) such that the Cesaro-means, ξ n 1 n n k=1 ξ j k converges almost surely to ξ * ∈ L ∞ (P). Note that ξ n belongs to V T as a convex combination of elements of V T . So ξ * belongs to the a.s. closure of V T . Since ρ is decreasing and stable by monotone convergence,
Finally, given the convergence of
ii) Suppose now that the convex space V T = V 
Dynamic hedging in the hedging framework
We now consider the global hedging problem in the entropic framework when the set of admissible gains V T is related to dynamic strategies. In this case, solving directly the primal problem (P) may be difficult. It is easier to work with its dual formulation. We will recall some classical results of the literature, which are useful for our problem.
V T as a set of dynamic financial strategies The framework we now consider is general but standard (see, for instance Delbaen-Schachermayer (1994) ). The basic financial assets are evaluated by their forward price at time T denoted by S. The process (S t ; t ∈ [0, T ]) is assumed to be a vector (P − t )-semi-martingale, locally particular set of financial assets S A whereas agent B has access to a set S B . We only consider financial assets, that at least one of the agents has access to. In others words, the set of basic financial assets is S = S A ∪ S B .
These assets have a forward price process S = S A , S T . It simply remains to decompose the vector process φ X ∈ Φ M into two components over the respective sets of assets S A and S B after having noticed that the set of admissible strategies associated with S A (resp. S B ) is included in Φ M . 
Comments
The framework of convex risk measures allows to set additional constraints or opportunities to economic agents without changing the characteristics of the general framework. In particular, a constraint imposed by another agent or the opportunity to invest on a financial market are technically equivalent as they simply lead to a transformation of the agent's initial risk measure into another convex risk measure: both correspond indeed to the solution of an inf-convolution problem. The penalty function of the generated risk measure is simply the sum of the penalty of the initial risk measure and the penalty associated with the constraint. The possibility of generating familiar risk measures opens for interesting economic interpretations. Modifications in the investment framework of an agent change her perception of risk and consequently generate a new risk measure. The fact that it still holds the key properties of monotonicity, convexity and translation invariance is consistent with the notion of risk measure itself.
In the optimal risk transfer problem we consider, the pricing rule of the structure is fully determined by the buyer as it binds her constraint at the optimum. It may be related to an indifference price, usually obtained in the problems of replicating a terminal cash flow using a utility criterion. Note that the negotiation takes place here at two levels: not only the price is at stake but also the structure (or equivalently, in some ways, the amount). This will lead to a higher probability of reaching an agreement between both agents. The optimal structure is explicitly derived when agents have dilated risk measures, generalizing the results obtained in the entropic framework. The optimal structure is always equal to a certain proportion of the issuer's initial exposure, the proportionality factor being constant and corresponding to the relative risk tolerance coefficient of the buyer. When both agents differ in their access to other investment opportunities either for hedging or diversification purposes, there is an additional term, taking into account these differences and leading both agents to more comparable profiles after the transaction. These results are especially interesting from a regulating point of view: standard diversification (i.e. simple quota sharing of the risk) will occur in exchange economies as soon as agents have dilated risk measures, or equivalently when they assess their respective risk exposure using the same family of risk measures and simply differ in their risk tolerance. The regulator may improve market diversification by imposing suitable and possibly different rules on agents.
In a general framework, when agents have different types of risk measure, an explicit derivation of the optimal structure is no longer possible even if some necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence are obtained. The use of dynamic programing techniques, in particular Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs) and non-linear Partial Differential Equations (PDEs), may help to study risk measures defined by their local specifications as in Barrieu-El Karoui (2004) . This question is an issue for further research.
